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In the course of explaining and anticipating thought 
and action, we characterize both ourselves and others in 
mental terms, e.g. as ‘believing the bus departs at ten’ or 
‘wanting to go swimming’. The ability to characterize 
oneself and others in such terms is central to 
understanding persons. It underwrites the self-attribution of 
beliefs, desires, emotions and other conscious, occurrent 
‘mental states’ (MS) and subserves MS-attribution to 
others. How do ordinary people understand the contents of 
mental state concepts like belief or desire? Philosophers of 
mind and cognitive scientists have put forward answers 
based on theory-theory (TT), modularity theory (MT) and 
simulation theory (ST). Before examining how these 
approaches explain the contents of MS-concepts, two 
widespread assumptions concerning everyday 
psychological attributions should be discussed. 
The first concerns the notion that the same MS-
concept is attributed in self-attributions and in other-
attributions, i.e. the same mental concept is applied to 
oneself and to others. On this assumption the concepts 
expressed by mental predicates are unitary and the mental 
predicates employed in attributions are not ambiguous 
between first-person and other person uses. The 
contention that mental state predicates are univocal and 
mental state concepts unitary is supported by the 
observation that first-person and third-person mental 
attributions are symmetric with respect to truth or falsity.  
The second assumption concerns whether there is 
a principled asymmetry between self- and other-
attributions of mental states, a point familiar from the 
discussions of L. Wittgenstein, P.F. Strawson, E. 
Tugendhat, G. Evans and D. Davidson. That there is an 
epistemological asymmetry between self-attribution and 
other-attribution concerning criteria for attribution, e.g. the 
observation of behavior and speech and the role of 
inference, has been argued by many. On the asymmetry 
assumption the grounds for self- and other-attributions of 
mental states vary, even though the meanings of the MS-
predicates employed appear to be univocal. One need not 
subscribe to a privileged access thesis in order to maintain 
that there is a principled asymmetry between self- and 
other-attributions. The notion that MS-concepts are 
indexical, i.e. tied to a particular point of view, suffices to 
induce an asymmetry between MS-attributions to oneself 
and to others.  
In attributing a mental state, an attributor 
characterizes the modality in the case of sensations and 
perceptions. In the case of beliefs and other “propositional 
attitudes” both the MS-type ψ and the content p must be 
characterized. Plausibly, the phrases ‘hoping it is raining’ 
and ‘believing it is raining’ characterize different mental 
states and express different MS-concepts, because the 
MS-types are different. Whereas, ‘believing it is raining’ 
and ‘believing the sun is shining’ are different states, 
because their contents differ, even though the MS-type is 
the same. Let’s set the question of content to one side and 
concentrate on MS-concepts. If the attribution of a mental 
state, whether to oneself or another, consists in 
characterizing a person’s mental condition as being of one 
type or another, then MS-attribution involves a judgement. 
Hence, the notion of a MS-type like believing, wanting, etc. 
is the notion of a mental concept. How do ordinary 
attributors understand mental concepts like belief or 
desire? 
According to TT, the concepts employed in MS-
attribution are theoretical concepts, postulated in 
explaining and predicting thought and action. In attributing 
mental states to ourselves and others, we inferentially 
apply a folk-psychological theory of mind. Depending on 
the particular version, the theory involved is conceived as 
a set of generalizations or laws for the deployment of 
mental concepts (Lewis 1972), or as a theory like any 
other scientific theory (Churchland 1988; Gopnik 1993). 
One attributes mental states by inferring their occurrence 
from observation of behavior and environmental events, 
i.e. by recognizing their causal-explanatory role in 
accordance with the theoretical generalizations comprising 
the theory. Versions of TT differ as to whether the theory in 
question is acquired through a process of theory formation 
analogous to scientific theorizing or through learning. 
However, both versions require that ordinary attributors 
grasp a mental concept as it is defined by the 
generalizations of the theory in order to make 
corresponding MS-attributions.  
On TT understanding a mental concept involves 
mastering theoretical generalizations about causal-
inferential relations and MS-representations. On one 
influential version, mental states like beliefs and desires 
are defined functionally in terms of their (causal) relations 
to events in the environment, other mental states and overt 
behavior. The concept of a mental state is the concept of a 
particular functional role. Specifying the content of a MS-
type on this account thus involves generalizations that 
make reference to dispositions, causal interactions or 
subjunctive considerations, as Alvin Goldman has pointed 
out. These generalizations -- specifically, the causal-
functional role the terms play in the generalizations of the 
folk-psychological theory -- determine the contents of 
mental concepts (Lewis 1972; Churchland 1988). 
Consequently, one must master the “theoretical” concepts 
of the theory in order to employ MS-predicates. Even 
though the grasp of mental concepts may be “tacit” or 
“implicit”, it is incumbent on the TT to explain how 
attributors can acquire facility with such concepts. In 
particular, TT must explain how ordinary attributors acquire 
and deploy such concepts, for the TT claims that 
knowledge of the folk-psychological theory of mind 
grounds MS-attributions. 
An important consequence of TT is that mental 
concepts are defined from what is essentially a third-
person or observer point of view. The contents of mental 
concepts are specified in terms of logical and 
epistemological relations between external stimuli, mental 
states and behavior, i.e. on the basis of inference and 
observation of external stimuli and behavior. They are not 
essentially linked to a first-person point of view. In this 
respect mental concepts as defined by TT do not differ in 
kind from non-mental concepts in theories about the 
natural world. Clearly, the third-person approach of TT to 
mental attribution accounts for the assumed uniformity in 
applying mental concepts. The same theory is used both in 
self- and other-attributions. By the same token, the TT 
entails that there is no principled asymmetry between MS-
attributions to oneself and to others; for we attribute mental 




states both to ourselves and others by means of the folk-
psychological theory and theory-mediated inference. 
However, the question of how one learns to apply folk 
platitudes to oneself or how theory formation gets started, 
e.g. where MS-concepts come from, remains open. 
Although modularity theories are often construed 
as versions of TT, even by their proponents, there are 
good reasons for treating them separately. For they 
construe cognitive structures like the apparatus of MS-
attribution as the result of innate modules, not as the 
consequence of an acquired theory. On MT mentalizing 
abilities are not developed from evidence in the course of 
development, but created from pre-determined 
representations of input. Leading proponents of modularity, 
Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor and Alan Leslie, differ 
significantly in their specific positions and respective 
claims about innate modules. However, the central idea is 
that the contents of everyday mental concepts in the 
Theory of Mind (ToM) are part of a special purpose body of 
knowledge in a mental module, which is innate and 
matures through a process of ontogenetic development 
(Fodor 1992; Leslie 1987). Although MT, like TT, construes 
MS-concepts as abstract theoretical postulates embedded 
in causal laws, it claims that such concepts are part of our 
innate endowment as humans. Consequently, their 
development is genetically determined and not based on 
theory construction. On MT mental concepts are present 
from the beginning and merely triggered by experience 
and maturation. Leslie (1994) postulates several different 
modules that come on line sequentially in children’s 
developing Theory of Mind. He hypothesizes that a 
domain-specific mechanism or information processing 
device, the ToM Module, computes data structures, 
metarepresentations, which specify attitude, agent, an 
anchor (an aspect of the real situation) and a pretend 
state. Modularity theories like Leslie’s ToMM hypothesis 
account for the assumption of uniformity by citing our 
innate endowment as members of the human species, but 
offer no further elaboration of mental state concepts. Thus, 
beyond MT’s claim that mental concepts are innate, the 
little light is shed on ordinary understanding of mental 
concepts. 
Simulation approaches deny that MS-attributions 
rely on theoretical knowledge and inference. They take the 
first-person point of view to be essential to mental states 
and concepts despite different views on the nature of 
simulation, e.g. on whether it involves analogical inference 
(Goldman), “ascent routines” (Gordon) or “co-cognition” 
and rationality assumptions (Heal). Simulationists also 
differ over whether prior possession of MS-concepts is 
required (Goldman; Heal) or not (Gordon). The central idea 
is that one uses one’s own cognitive resources to attribute 
mental states by pretending or imagining oneself to be in 
the other’s position and then generating the thoughts or 
actions attributed to the other within a simulation. 
On Alvin Goldman’s introspection-based ST, one 
attributes mental states to others by using one’s own 
cognitive and inferential mechanisms to match those of 
another person (1993, 2000). Simulation terminates in an 
analogical inference from oneself to the other. The end 
product is a judgement, which classifies an (occurrent) 
mental state as a token of a particular MS-type and thus 
requires mental concepts. Goldman proposes an account 
of mental concepts in terms of introspection or self-
monitoring, not simulation. He suggests we have a first-
person, introspective understanding of MS-concepts which 
rests on direct, non-inferential access to our conscious 
mental states, i.e. inner sense or higher-order perception. 
Goldman hypothesizes that some sort of intrinsic (non-
relational) and categorial (non-dispositional) properties of 
mental states are available to the cognitive system. These 
internally detectable properties of MS-tokens are definitive 
of a particular MS-type and form the basis for our 
understanding of mental state concepts.  
The asymmetry of self- and other-attributions is a 
central tenet of Goldman’s account, for the contents of 
mental concepts are anchored in “phenomenologically 
disinctive” MS-properties which are introspectively 
detectable. On this view the question of the uniformity of 
MS-attributions stands and falls with the viability of the 
analogical inference from oneself to the other. Specifically, 
what reason is there on Goldman’s view to assume that 
others have mental states like one’s own? This is the 
conceptual problem of other minds. In response Goldman 
has proposed a dual-representation hypothesis for MS-
concepts like desires, suggesting that one develops two 
sorts of MS-representations: representations of inner 
features and representations of behavioral characteristics, 
perhaps based on resonance phenomena like “mirror 
neurons” (2000). However, this response still does not 
meet the “other minds”-objection which undermines any 
uniformity assumption. 
Robert Gordon takes the simulation approach itself 
to have direct implications for our understanding of mental 
concepts. He denies that simulation relies on introspective 
access to one’s own mental states or that it involves an 
implicit analogical inference (1995). He introduces the 
notion of an ‘ascent routine’ to account for self- and other-
attributions of mental states without introspection or 
analogical inference. An ascent routine is a procedure 
which allows one to get the answer to a question about 
one’s mental condition by answering a question that is not 
about oneself or mental states, e.g. “Do you believe that 
Mickey Mouse has a tail?”, by asking oneself an “outward-
looking” question about the world, “Does Mickey Mouse 
have a tail?”. 
According to Gordon, an attributor “recenters her 
cognitive map” on the other so that the first-person 
pronoun ‘I’ refers to the individual on whom the attributor’s 
egocentric map has been recentered. After this imaginative 
transformation into the other, a simulator directly attributes 
the belief or decision generated within the scope of 
simulation to the other via an ascent routine, thus obviating 
the need for an analogical inference. Other-attribution is, in 
essence, a case of mental “self”-attribution to oneself-as-
the-other within the context of simulation. This is because 
embedding an ascent routine within a simulation allows 
one to attribute mental states to the other „directly“. On 
Gordon’s account an egocentric shift on the part of the 
attributor lies at the core of simulation and the ascent 
routine is the key to other-attribution and self-attribution. 
Note that Gordon’s ascent routine ST accommodates the 
uniformity assumption by default, since self- attributions 
and other-attributions are cases of „self“-attribution via 
ascent routines. 
Gordon suggests that ascent routines provide the 
basis for an account of MS-concepts in terms of simulation 
and indicate how we go about mastering mental state 
concepts, because they provide a way of reconceptualizing 
pains and beliefs as having a mental location (1996). 
However, this is not the case. The meanings of mental 
predicates and a grasp of mental concepts must be 
presupposed in order to get an ascent routine started. One 
must understand that the initial question in the example is 
about belief, not hope or desire. Thus, the ascent routine 
procedure does not supply the foundation for an account of 
mental state concepts. It does accommodate the 
indexicality intuition through the notion of a mental 
location, but it falls short of capturing the asymmetry of 
mental attribution. For mental attribution is essentially self-
attribution either directly via ascent routine or to oneself-




as-the-other within a simulation. It remains unclear how 
genuine other-attribution is to be understood. The crucial 
assumption that one can mentally “transform oneself into 
the other”, “recenter one’s cognitive map” or “become the 
other” remains a metaphor, leaving any asymmetry 
between self- and other-attribution of mental states a 
mystery. In the end, imaginative transformation cum 
ascent routine appears to presuppose an account of the 
contents of mental concepts, rather than providing one. 
Neither TT, MT or ST accommodates both the 
uniformity and the asymmetry assumption. However, it is 
argued that they are well-motivated and cannot be 
dismissed out of hand, if we are to explicate how people 
understand everyday mental states. As things stand, the 
answer to the question whether our understanding of 
everyday mental concepts is a matter of theory or 
simulation is ‘neither of the above’. 
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